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The Political Regard in  
Medieval Islamic Thought 
Neguin Yavari ∗ 
Abstract: »Der politische Aspekt im Islamischen Denken des Mittelalters«. Glob-
al intellectual history has attracted traction in the past decade, but the field 
remains focused on the modern period and the diffusion of Western political 
concepts, ideologies, and methodologies. This paper suggests that juxtaposing 
political texts from the medieval Islamic world with their Christian counterparts 
will allow for a better understanding of the contours of the debate on the 
space for politics, framed in primary sources as the perennial tug of war be-
tween religious and lay authority. The implications of this line of inquiry for the 
history of European political thought are significant as well. Many of the prem-
ises and characteristics that are considered singularly European, such as conti-
nuity between past and present, as well as a strong performative regard to po-
litical thought, are equally present in non-European (in this instance Islamic) 
debates. It is more a matter of perspective than essence that distinguishes the 
history of European political thought, and a wider perspective through juxta-
position of texts and concepts would enhance the global debate by introducing 
new questions from rarely visited quarters. 
Keywords: Al-Ghazali, Ockham, Islamic political thought, common good, Secu-
larity, global political thought, comparative political thought, Presentism. 
 
A simple query frames the present inquiry: Is the history of political thought in 
a non-Western context possible? In spite of the great methodological strides in 
intellectual history since its emergence from the doldrums in the last decades of 
the twentieth century, the sub-discipline has remained stubbornly impervious to 
non-Western thought. Much of this is by design. Intellectual history is engaged, 
as Anthony Grafton has pointed out, in a search for the origins of modern polit-
ical thought which is premised upon a past that diverges from the present 
(Grafton 2006, 1-32). Tracing the roots of a modern world that is thought to be 
an improvement on its past creates continuity between past and present. The 
recovery of the republican or neo-Roman concept of liberty at the heart of 
Machiavelli’s ideological universe by Quentin Skinner, for example, changed 
the terms of the debate on the origins of modern political thought in the West-
ern academy. That paradigm of recovery, however, implies, as hinted above, a 
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Whiggish narrative of incremental improvement and progress. For the term 
“origins” does not simply imply a beginning, albeit elusive, but as observed by 
Marc Bloch, it carries with it a host of implicit explanations to buttress value 
judgments (Bloch 1953, 29-35). In more ways than one, historians are also the 
begetters, or rather the forgers, of intellectual history. 
On those and similar grounds, many a practitioner of intellectual history has 
argued against comparisons with non-Western histories of thought, or compari-
sons that predate a globalized world. Popular justifications for cordoning off 
the modern West from the rest of history include the fact that state and society 
were not differentiated in the medieval period, that manners and modes of 
exchange or cross-pollination prior to the age of steam and print remain unre-
coverable, and that attempts at cross-cultural engagement were few and far 
between and their retrieval now induces anachronistic assumptions. Samuel 
Moyn, for example, insists on modern and capitalist social formations for the 
spread of “concept global” (Moyn 2013, 187-204) and, in the case of a concept 
generated in non-Western societies, Andrew Sartori argues that “it would need 
to be fully intelligible within the European intellectual context” (Sartori 2010, 
322). Global intellectual history for Sartori and others is predicated upon trans-
latability, or the potential to formulate a political claim that, explicitly or not, 
reflects, illuminates, and addresses that which is already in existence.1 
All this tends to suggest that a political claim considered worthy of its name 
is bound by European articulations of the political and that, from a wider per-
spective, histories of political thought are themselves part of the arsenal of 
modern imperialism (Bell 2013, 537-40); or in the words of John Dunn, “the 
study of political thought remains intractably historical” (Dunn 1996, 13). And 
Jeremy Adelman has pointed out global history’s lackluster engagement with 
disjuncture, disintegration, and dissonance – all critical components of deep 
histories of global transformation (Adelman 2017). To Adelman, global history 
has actually contributed to “the Anglicizing of intellectual lives around the 
world” as “English has become Globish,” the tongue of globalization.  
There is another valence to the predatory nature of global history that de-
serves our attention. In the same way that conceptions of secularism remain 
heavily vested in Christian discursive, infrastructural, and historical templates, 
no matter the numerous refutations, the linear trajectory of progress that un-
derwrites European/Western exceptionalism remains firmly embedded in histo-
riographical paradigms and periodization schemes that govern writings on the 
past. What happens if we turn our attention away from the eighteenth century 
and from Europe, and from the emergence of strong secular states that divided 
the public and private spheres, and finally, from religion brushed aside, to 
societies where a new set of values with long roots did not supplant the past? 
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Are these societies condemned to a verdict of perpetual senescence? And, is it 
possible to read texts for context, or as a window into a worldview, if the val-
ues adumbrated in those texts do not take hold in society, or to study those that 
produce political communities that are radically different from the ones that 
emerged in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? Is theirs a fun-
damentally different regime of historicity, to borrow François Hartog’s para-
digm? Is it possible to rescue the non-Western past from its present status as 
reified heritage (Hartog 2005, 7-18)? 
While the language of politics in medieval Christian thought remains direct-
ly comparable with that produced in the Islamic world, as I hope to demon-
strate, no ready comparison is allowed – on the historical or historiographical 
register – between modern Europe and the modern Middle East. But if it can be 
demonstrated that concurrent but non-synchronous discursive pasts have pro-
duced different presents, then how may continuity between past and present – 
the pride and joy of European intellectual history – be maintained? If intellec-
tual historians concur that ideas must be considered in context, or that there is a 
‘proper fit’ between an idea and its age, then how may we account for similar 
ideas in different historical contexts? 
In what follows, I argue that juxtaposing political texts from the medieval 
Islamic world with their Christian counterparts will allow for a better under-
standing of the contours of the debate on the space for politics that Larry 
Scanlon has called quasi-secularity (Scanlon 1994, 322),2 framed in medieval 
sources as the perennial tug of war between religious and lay authority. The 
comparative lens will bring into question the long-held belief that if the deline-
ation of that relationship (between secular and religious authority) is markedly 
different in the modern progeny of the Christian world, i.e., the West, from the 
one in place in some regions of the Islamic world, it is because of a series of 
sharp differences in the debates in their past incarnations. Such comparisons 
will also put a spotlight on present-day organizations of politics – and regimes 
of historicity – that inform the study of past political thought. The implications 
of this line of inquiry for the history of European political thought are signifi-
cant as well. 
To a good number of intellectual historians, a proper comparative approach 
to political thought is bound to be a study in difference. Andrew March, for 
example, argues that comparative political theory  
needs to explain why it is not merely expanding the canon to include non-
Western texts and why a certain non-Western text is ‘alien,’ thus justifying the 
moniker comparative. (March 2006, 531)  
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The contribution of a Muslim theorist to political thought is not sufficient to 
qualify the enterprise as “comparative,” for it is no different than proclamations 
by a Norwegian or a Buddhist, or even a Marxist thinker on the subject. March 
sets out ten theses to conclude that comparative political theory must be en-
gaged, that is, it must study “the contestations of norms, values, and principles 
between distinct and coherent doctrines of thought.” In his words,  
a genuinely comparative political theory (as opposed to a better political theo-
ry or a better universalism) must have a conception of what makes a tradition 
distinct from another (a role, I argue, that is best filled by religion). (ibid., 
564) 
There are, of course, vast differences between the worlds of Christianity and 
Islam in the Age of Global Intensification, to use Robert Moore’s helpful label 
for the period from 500 to 1500 (Moore 2016, 80-92).3 But can a comparative 
inquiry that focuses on difference produce new knowledge, or generate fresh 
approaches? Or will the results infallibly reiterate the stale claim of an apparent 
divergence – at some indeterminate point in the Middle Ages, and for reasons 
that remain opaque, between Europe and the rest of the world? Built on the 
method that Wiebke Denecke has called “ellipsis,” such studies engage in what 
is a necessarily futile interrogation of one culture for lacking things commonly 
found in another (Denecke 2013, 12-5). 
By way of an example, consider a recent article by three political scientists 
at Stanford: Lisa Blaydes, Justin Grimmer, and Alison McQueen, where they 
have subjected several Christian and Islamic mirrors for princes to automated 
text analysis in order to shed light on the issue of “speaking truth to power” 
(Blaydes, Grimmer, and McQueen 2013). The authors find that as early as the 
ninth century, and as feudalism took hold in Europe, Christian mirrors dis-
played a more explicit political language. In the Islamic world, by contrast, 
what they call “Mamlukism,” by which they mean the use of military slaves 
imported from non-Muslim lands, undermined genuine political critique. Feu-
dalism is problematic enough as a moniker with no fixed meaning (Wickham 
1985, 166-96) and, as Chris Wickham demonstrated more than three decades 
ago, it was by no means a stranger to medieval Islamic economies. “Mam-
lukism” surely holds little analytical promise if it is used as a blanket term to 
describe political and social orders in effect throughout the Islamic world from 
the ninth century onwards. Even less so if we consider that the ruling houses 
that arose from among these military slaves reigned over the Islamic world for 
a good millennium after the ninth century.4 Finally, even as a paradigm for 
                                                             
3  I am also mindful here of Timothy Reuter’s critical conundrum: “Do we compare societies at 
the same point of time, or at the same stage of development?” See Reuter 1998, 41; and 
Osterhammel 2011, xv-xxii, 45-76. 
4  The legal status of military slaves in medieval Islamic polities is by no means a settled mat-
ter, especially in the light of their swift and pervasive rise to political power; for examples 
 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  56 
characterizing the history of Egypt and Syria in the fifteenth century, “Mam-
lukism” has long been discarded. The approach merely resuscitates the tired 
claim that sharp divisions separate the contemporary Western and Islamic 
worlds in spite of the latter’s fecund past. 
Similarly, the emphasis on difference and absence pervades Eduardo Man-
zano’s study that points to the different processes of institutionalization that 
prevailed in the medieval Christian and Islamic worlds. Institutions are im-
portant, Manzano writes, because they are engines of growth and key to the 
economic and social transformations of Europe in the fourteenth century. They 
are different in the Islamic world, we are told,  
because of the separation between power and authority that emerged at an ear-
ly and critical stage in the Islamic polity; and, the distinctive notion of com-
munity that emerged as a result of this and helped to shape the self-definition 
of Muslim societies and the making of the social regularities that performed 
processes of institutionalization in early Islam. (Manzano 2015, 127)  
While medieval Europe produced institutions that combined varying degrees of 
power and authority notwithstanding their character or origins – institutions 
that arose in the Islamic world lacked authority as it was consistently denied to 
them by holders of legitimacy; that is, the clerics. Manzano’s thesis – that 
strong states grew to dominate the Christian lands whereas states in the Islamic 
world remained weak as religion successfully monopolized the traffic in au-
thority – has been the mantra of academic scholarship on the Islamic world for 
almost a century. 
By way of contrast, consider here an argument for political change in the re-
lation between court and church as reflected in political tracts from fifteenth-
century England. Strohm has demonstrated that manipulations of pictorial and 
textual representations of the wheel of fortune in Lydgate’s (d. ca. 1451) Fall 
of Princes, his rendition of De casibus viroum illustrium, points to the gradual 
ascendancy of the king over fortune and religious authority a good number of 
decades before Machiavelli’s (d. 1527) The Prince. Lydgate’s opening depicts 
an illustration of Edward IV (r. 1461-83, with a brief interlude in 1470-1) rid-
ing the wheel of fortune, from which his Lancastrian predecessors are tum-
bling, and the wheel itself flanked by the clerical hierarchy on the one hand and 
the nobility on the other. The “image of Reason on public view and arrayed in 
the robes of an English judge accents a new and more general role of Reason as 
an arbiter of secular conduct,” according to Strohm. In the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, he argues, “Fortune is detached from its reliance upon God’s 
Providence,” and it is treated as “an autonomous locus of the unpredictability 
in human affairs, and thus an apt incentive to human precaution” (Strohm 2005, 
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D’hulster 2016; Paul 1994, 4-5; and Amitai 2007.  
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114-5). According to Strohm, the idea that fortune might be mastered opened a 
space for the secular practice of statecraft as a product of human exertion. In 
this new climate, “reason is not implementing the process, or even just oversee-
ing it, but intervening in a new and unprecedented way, by ‘spiking’ the wheel 
to arrest its course” (ibid.). It is the dawn of a new era.  
Turning from fifteenth-century England to the last decade of the eleventh 
century in Iran, the vizier Nizam al-Mulk’s (d. 1092) widely read and influen-
tial Siyar al-muluk (“The Way of Kings”) is strikingly similar in political lan-
guage to Strohm’s mirrors and predates them by almost four centuries. A cele-
brated vizier and a stalwart figure of power and authority in medieval Islamic 
society, Nizam al-Mulk dominated the Saljuq Empire (1040-1194) in its hey-
days in the eleventh century. Such was his standing among the great and the 
good of his era that his name was put forward as an apt replacement for the 
‘Abbasid caliph himself, by no less an authoritative figure than the celebrated 
theologian and jurist, the Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 1085) (al-Juwayni 
1979, 246-55, Heck 2012). In his chapter “On the Turn of Fortune’s Wheel and 
in praise of the Master of the World – May God Confirm His Sovereignty,” the 
turning of the wheel of fortune and kingship enjoy a direct and unmediated 
relationship:  
God chooses in every age and in every time, one member of the human race, 
and having endowed him with the interests of the world and the well-being of 
His servants; He charges that person to close the doors of corruption, confu-
sion and discord, and He imparts to him such majesty and dignity in the eyes 
and hearts of men, that under his just rule they may live their lives in constant 
security and every wish for his reign to continue. (Nizam al-Mulk 1978, 11) 
God’s punishment for disobedience or disregard for divine law (presumably by 
His subjects, including the king) is the disappearance of kingship altogether, 
and the inauguration of civil strife and destruction. A new king then comes 
about:  
by divine decree one human being acquires prosperity and power, and accord-
ing to his deserts The Truth bestows good fortune upon him and gives him wit 
and wisdom, wherewith he may employ his subordinates and every one ac-
cording to his merits and confer upon each a dignity and a station proportion-
ate to his power. (Nizam al-Mulk 1978, 11)  
While the selection of the king is a divine prerogative, it is the wisdom of the 
king that employs good counsel and protects it, for good rule is also contingent 
on advice purveyed by others. 
The claim here is not that Nizam al-Mulk pre-empted Lydgate and arrived 
way ahead at an imaginary finishing line; or that there is a connection, however 
tenuous, between European and Islamic political thought in the premodern 
period. Rather, the imperative in comparisons drawn between historically non-
related cultures is to move beyond “the comfort zone of influence, travel, mi-
gration and diffusion,” because, as Denecke has pointed out, textual traditions 
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“do not travel like guns, germs and steel; not even like coins, miniature paint-
ings, or religious statuettes” (Denecke 2013, 292). What is meant is that juxta-
posing the eleventh-century vizier with the fifteenth-century poet forces a re-
consideration of the linear relationship between discourse and history that is 
often considered an exclusive prerogative of European historiography and, by 
extension, history tout court. If mastery of fortune may be read as proof of 
incipient secularity, then what the comparative frame yields is the inescapable 
truth – evidenced in subsequent history – that secular political langue acts upon 
the political sphere differently in differing contexts. And secondly, the compar-
ative frame underscores Peter Gordon’s exhortation that “it is time to discount 
the epistemological and normative (and implicitly metaphysical) premise that 
ideas are properly understood only if they are studied within the context of 
their initial articulation” (Gordon 2014, 36-7). For implicit in this idea of initial 
context, Gordon argues, is the conviction that it is “not merely different than 
but in fact authoritative over and against all later manifestations or deploy-
ments of an idea” (ibid.). Nizam al-Mulk’s irrefutably earlier although most 
probably not initial articulation of mastery of the wheel of fortune demonstrates 
that in at least one important regard – the relationship between political rule 
and divine will – the discursive spheres of premodern England and Iran over-
lap. That coincidence necessitates an argument for multiple contexts, as op-
posed to one native context in which an idea, principle, or ideology may be 
understood.  
The same line of inquiry opens the discussion by another bureaucrat-turned-
historian, the anonymous (conventionally referred to as Ibn al-Balkhi) late 
eleventh-century author of Farsnama (Book of Fars). His is a history of Fars, 
the initial homeland of the Sasanians (224-650), Iran’s last pre-Islamic ruling 
house. Written around the time of Nizam al-Mulk’s death, Farsnama begins 
with:  
When God chooses from among his servants a noble person and places in his 
grasp the reins of kingship and sovereignty and gives to him the dominion and 
protection of the world, the greatest favor which He can show towards that 
king in particular and the world in general is to incline the aspirations of the 
king of the time towards knowledge and justice, because all virtues are con-
tained in these two excellent qualities. (Ibn al-Balkhi 1921, 1) 
In this instance, the cornerstone of the king’s sovereignty comprises two God-
given, secular qualities. And God’s sovereignty in this passage is legal fiction, 
for while the selection of the king can be conceived as strictly a divine preroga-
tive, the craft of ruling is an entirely human affair. In medieval Islamic political 
langue, although good kings are considered ipso facto pious, their success in 
this world is measured not by their piety but by their ability to rule with wis-
dom and discernment. Their demise is brought about by bad judgment and not 
by fortune.  
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  59 
The sovereignty of God in the political realm was effectively articulated in a 
similarly fictive manner in the medieval Christian world. There, the divine will 
of God, which worked in His service and at His bidding, provided the founda-
tion for political legitimacy. But that un-historical and extra-temporal dimen-
sion, although in theory the origin of government, “provided medieval kings 
with few guides to action and little in the way of explicit programs of political 
policy” (Spiegel 1975, 315), as Gabrielle Spiegel has shown. Rule by the Grace 
of God, gratia Dei rex, was regularly complemented with norms and policies 
set by kings of the past, which allowed kings to justify their rule.  
An identical use of the past is paraded in the court historian Abu al-Fadl 
Bayhaqi’s celebrated early eleventh-century opus, where kingship and religion 
are thusly separated: 
Know that God Most High has given one power to the prophets, may God’s 
blessings be upon all of them, and another power to kings. He has made it in-
cumbent upon the creatures on the face of the earth that they should follow 
those two powers and through them recognise that divinely-given straight path 
[…] The power specific to the Prophets lies in their evidentiary miracles, that 
is things that ordinary people are incapable of doing. The power of monarchs 
comprises a discriminating intellect, military might, conquests and victory 
over enemies, together with the justice which they dispense in conformity 
with the commands of God Most High. For the distinction between divinely-
assisted and successful monarchs and a tyrannical rebel is that, since mon-
archs are characterised by the dispensing of justice, good actions, good behav-
iour and praiseworthy deeds, they should be obeyed [and acknowledged as 
chosen by God for their task]. Usurpers who practise oppression and evil must 
be stigmatised as rebels, and holy war (jehād) must be waged on them. This is 
a measure by which those who do good and those who do evil are assessed 
and show their true nature. One can know by necessity which of those two 
persons one must obey. In regard to our monarchs (may God be merciful to 
those who have passed away and give long life to those who are still living!), 
one must observe how they have led their lives in the past and how they live at 
present–their justice, beneficent behaviour, pious restraint, religious zeal, puri-
ty of daily existence, their pacification of persons and lands, and their cutting 
short the hands of tyrants and oppressors–so that one becomes assured that 
they are among the chosen ones of the Creator, His mightiness be exalted and 
His name sanctified, and that obedience to them has been a divinely-imposed 
duty and continues to be so. (Beyhaqī 2011, 182-3) 
Bayhaqi’s carefully worded exhortation encourages men to follow the two 
powers and through them recognize the divinely ordained straight path, the 
shariʻa. He points as well to the potent practical regard of historical writing, for 
one must learn about kings of the past to learn to distinguish the monarch from 
the tyrant. Reason, Bayhaqi writes, will prevent men from being misled by 
falsehood. 
While the divorcing of politics from fortune heralds the dawn of a new era 
in Lydgate’s England, and the onset of the rule of reason, no similar transfor-
mation has been recognized in modern accounts of medieval Islamic political 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  60 
thought, or even politics. There, the twining of religion and state is upheld as a 
salient theme of medieval Islamic politics, inherited from pre-Islamic Iran 
(Grignaschi 1966, 49), and in full force throughout a millennium. In effect, the 
twining of religion and politics is read to explain the failure of the Islamic 
world to mirror its Western neighbors and construct a modern political frame-
work, replacing religious norms with liberal values – an almost complete inver-
sion of Scanlon’s quasi-secularity. 
In medieval Islamic political langue, the twinning of kingship and religion is 
a strategy of domestication (Yavari 2014, 81-94). By granting to the precept 
deep historical roots as a pre-Islamic Iranian ideal, medieval theorists sought 
less to justify the dominion of religion over politics than the very opposite. In 
modern studies, that attribution has been taken at face value. But there is very 
little that is exclusively or essentially Persian or Zoroastrian about the twinning 
of religion and state. The dictum is found in abundance in political writings 
from across the globe, as we shall see in several examples below. Moreover, 
there is nothing about it that can be contextualized to the reign of a specific 
Sasanian dynast. Finally, idealized representations of alien cultures were com-
monplace in antique historiography. Arnaldo Momigliano has pointed to the 
imaginary aspect of Persian representations in Greek writings of the period.  
The name of Zoroaster, like that of Hermes, became the centre of attraction 
for any sort of speculation which had something to do with astrology, the af-
ter-life and more generally the mysteries of nature. (Momigliano 1978, 145) 
In truth, there is a lot more politics embedded in this axiom than suggested in 
the tacitly accepted commonplace that good religion and kingship thriving in 
unison is the bedrock of Islamic political theory. 
The exhortation to strong political rule, one of the loci where incipient secu-
larity resides, was not limited to politicians and courtiers, nor did the augment-
ed standing of the ‘ulama’ (Muslim theologians and jurisprudents) by the tenth 
century extinguish the debate. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Islam’s preeminent medi-
eval theologian, wrote on the relationship between kings and their subjects in 
unambiguous terms: 
Everybody to whom God has given religion must therefore love and obey 
kings and recognize that their kingship is granted by God, and given by Him 
to whom He wills. 
God’s favor is signaled in long rule, and the  
unjust Sultan is ill-starred and will have no endurance, because the Prophet 
stated that ‘sovereignty endures even when there is unbelief, but will not en-
dure when there is injustice.’ (al-Ghazālī 1964, 46) 
Judgment of the king’s probity belongs to God alone, but at the same time, 
kings are measured by their policies and practices. 
Medieval Muslim intellectuals preach a strict divide between religion and 
politics – in religion’s favor, of course – to demarcate the purview of legitimate 
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political rule. In the anonymous Tuhfat al-muluk dar adab (“A Gift to Kings in 
Civility”), penned sometime between the early thirteenth and the latter part of 
the fourteenth century, Malikshah the Saljuq sultan (r. 1073-92) is chided for 
interfering in religious affairs by the aforementioned Imam al-Haramayn al-
Juwayni. In one anecdote, the sultan arrives in Nishapur when 29 days have 
passed in the month of Ramadan. His courtiers tell him that the crescent of the 
new moon is visible and therefore ‘id al-fitr (celebrations that mark the end of 
the fasting month of Ramadan) should be celebrated the next day. Word spread 
quickly to Imam al-Haramayn, who did not hesitate to announce that he would 
nevertheless keep his fast, as should his followers. Against the mischievous 
advice of his courtiers who advocated a swift rebuke, Malikshah asked that the 
theologian be summoned with great respect. When brought into his presence, 
al-Juwayni told the sultan that all the sultan’s royal decrees (firman) are obliga-
tory on his subjects. But that which belongs to the realm of religious order 
(fatwa) is incumbent on all sultans. The shari‘a, al-Juwayni claimed, stipulates 
parity between the firman of the sultans and the fatwa of the ‘ulama,’ and fast-
ing clearly belongs to the realm of the latter. Malikshah sent the cleric home 
fully convinced of his righteousness (Anonymous 1938, 15-17). The way the 
anecdote is carefully related not only distinguishes the two spheres of divine 
and secular but also stresses that such a clear division stops the chaos which 
ensues when decision making is left on the basis of hearsay to an indeterminate 
and changing group of people keen to settle scores. 
Just as the illustration of Edward IV juxtaposes the nobility with the clergy, 
Nizam al-Mulk, al-Ghazali and many others twin religion with kingship and, 
against the consensus of modern scholarship, render the former dependent on 
the latter. The intricate twinning of kingship and religion is echoed as well in 
medieval mirrors from distant origins, which further dispels facile contextual-
ization. 
In an anonymous thirteenth-century Norse mirror for princes,5 the king ad-
vises his son on that which unites and separates God’s kingdoms on earth:  
God has established two houses upon earth, each chosen for a definite service. 
The one is the church; in fact we may give this name to both, if we like, for 
the word church means the same as judgment hall, because there the people 
meet and assemble. These two houses are the halls of God, and He has ap-
pointed two men to keep watch over them. In one of these halls He has placed 
His table, and this is called the house of bread; for there God’s people gather 
to receive spiritual food. But in the other hall He has placed His holy judg-
ment seat and there the people assemble to hear the interpretation of God’s ho-
ly verdicts. And God has appointed two keepers to guard these houses: the one 
is the king, the other the bishop […] both these halls are God’s houses and 
both king and bishop the servants of God and keepers of these houses; but 
they do not own them. (Anonymous 1917, 358-64) 
                                                             
5  For more on the politics of religion in this text, see Bragge 1987, 11-20, 210-8. 
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Religion and kingship are twinned in this thirteenth-century text to demarcate 
their differing function and purview, and as always, to tame religion, but not 
before they are twinned as God’s possession and in equal measure, accountable 
to His will. The twinning of religion and kingship as God’s twin halls, in the 
context of an erring high priest, Abiathar, who had wrongfully deposed Solo-
mon before God had so decreed and was therefore punished when Solomon 
rightfully deposed him, posits Solomon as the executor of God’s judgment. 
King and bishop are equal servants of God, an ideological stance firmly cast in 
religious language that promotes secular authority’s independence from reli-
gion. 
Arguing from the other side presumably, the hugely influential Augustinian 
Giles of Rome (d. 1316), archbishop of Bourges appointed by Pope Boniface 
VIII (d. 1303), twinned the temporal sword with the ecclesiastical one, to argue 
that although “the earthly power is appointed not only through the ecclesiasti-
cal by special divine command, but actually by the ecclesiastical,” and that the 
Church has both swords, “she does not have the right to wield both swords,” 
and not just because an intermediary is necessary between “the ecclesiastical 
power and the judgment of blood,” but because “the material and inferior 
sword is jointed to the spiritual and superior sword, and that by these two 
swords the whole people is fittingly ruled, and consequently, that whole people 
is adorned and ornamented” (Giles of Rome 2004, 246-67). In this passage and 
elsewhere,6 Giles asserts the superiority of royal power by recourse to religious 
metaphors. 
Should the twinning of religion and kingship, deployed differently on differ-
ent occasions, not be considered a global political concept, operational in mul-
tiple, concurrent but non-synchronous contexts, none of which are original to 
it? Reading opposites as an interpretive strategy was a common feature of 
political discourse in the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds.7 The semiotic 
valences of paired contraries invite interpretation and unravel literal readings. 
The twinning of religion and kingship is neither a remnant from pre-Islamic 
Iran, nor is it a quintessentially Islamic concept. In abundant supply in pre-
modern discourse everywhere, it signifies an opening, a strategy for thinking 
about politics.  
Far from a timeless ideal that guarantees the hold of religion over public life 
throughout the ages, the fraternity of religion and state is properly understood 
only with due attention to its performative regard. It is no coincidence that the 
                                                             
6  For other instances where Giles uses the Aristotelian outlook as a form of rhetorical device, 
see Kempshall 2007, and Lachaud 2014. 
7  I have in mind Nicholas of Cusa’s (d. 1464) notion of coincidentia oppositorum and its 
heuristic significance; see Nicholas of Cusa 1985, I: 4, 22; and for a fuller account of the 
twinning of religion and kingship and the pairing of contraries as political langue, see Yavari 
2014, 113-42. 
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precept is frequently invoked in writings from the eleventh century, when a 
new political order supplanted that of the past in the Islamic world, ushering in 
an era of sultanic rule, to use Stefan Leder’s term (Leder 2015, 97-98).8 A 
defanged caliphate in Baghdad, with neither power nor authority, coexisted 
with a succession of dynastic houses – often short-lived – in control of various 
parts of the caliphate. It would be a mistake to assume that the political and 
scholarly elites of the era were merely sleepwalking into a new world. The 
intellectual record preserves a fierce debate among competing conceptions of 
sovereignty and good rule, often linked to varying theologies of what was 
conceived as “true Islam.”9 
The fabled al-Ghazali was at the forefront of those debates. To resolve the 
crisis and to push back against attempts to resuscitate the caliphate with a vapid 
notion of Islamic legitimacy that had no historical or textual roots, al-Ghazali 
advocated an Islamic state that recognized parity between caliphal and non-
caliphal rule. Political authority belonged to the sultan – on account of his 
might and strength (shawka) – and was wholly unmediated. The caliphs, on the 
other hand, commanded supreme religious authority, for the law (shari‘a) 
could not be upheld without them (Campanini 2011, 234-7; Glassen 1981, 63-
84). He explicitly enjoined the caliph not to intervene in the sultan’s sphere 
(Crone 2004, 237-49). Al-Ghazali’s diminished caliphate, a largely religious 
and apolitical presence, stemmed from his conviction that the caliphate of the 
early ninth century could not be restored but, at the same time, that no polity 
could thrive without a shared ideology. The ‘Abbasid caliphate was to be kept 
alive, but not as a bastion of fanaticism enthralled by Ḥanbali (a literalist 
school of Sunni jurisprudence) rabble-rousers itching to take to the streets to 
silence opponents. In Baghdad, where the ‘Abbasids still enjoyed a measure of 
control over political life after the tenth century, riots instigated by Hanbalis 
against Shi‘is (the second main branch of Islam best explained as a conceptual 
antipode to the Sunni) as well as other Sunnis such as the Mu‘tazilis (a rational-
ist school of Islamic theology) or Ash‘aris (a centrist theological school of 
Sunni Islam) were frequent.10 More often than not, the medieval histories criti-
cized the ‘Abbasid caliphs for abetting the riots. By recognizing the autochtho-
                                                             
8  The de facto sultanic model that prevailed from the tenth century is distinct from the 
secular/sacred dual leadership model adopted by the ‘Alid opposition in the seventh and 
eighth centuries, see Sharon 1983, 228. 
9  The resonances with European political thought in a later period are instructive. Brent 
Nongbri argues that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as intra-Christian violence 
over the question of the “true religion” was growing, political theorists, such as Jean Bodin 
and John Locke, began to conceive of religion as a distinct, privatized sphere of activity that 
should support and not disturb the affairs of the newly-emerging nation states that rede-
fined the European political landscape; Nongbri 2013, 9-10. 
10  For a fuller discussion of Ḥanbali politics in the eleventh century, see Allard 1960; Cook 
2005, 116-28; and for factional strife in eastern Iran in this period, see Bulliet 1972, 28-46. 
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nous sovereignty of non-caliphal rule, al-Ghazali sought to deprive the ‘Abbas-
ids of their longstanding privilege as apportioners of Islamic legitimacy and 
orthodoxy, and thus curtail their ability to instigate religious strife. 
In the annals of medieval political thought, al-Ghazali is on record – as we 
have seen – for advocating strong kingship and sovereign local rule, hardly a 
reactionary, or even a proto-salafi (an ideology that selectively idealizes as-
pects of early Islamic practice) position. And in his theological writings, he 
emphasized reconciliation and restraint against anathematizing his opponents 
(Van Ess 2006, 39-44). Yet he is consistently taken to task in modern scholar-
ship for his role in the decline of philosophy in the Islamic world and for in-
cremental ossification of political thought. The accusation was voiced by Ern-
est Renan in the late nineteenth century (Renan 1883) and reiterated in 
academic discourse in the early twentieth century with the publication of de 
Boer’s History of Philosophy in Islam (De Boer 1903, 154-72). De Boer ended 
his presentation with Averroes who died in 1198. From then on, he claimed, 
students of philosophy in the Islamic world were mostly epitomists – merely 
engaged in glossing on early works without themselves contributing original 
thoughts (Griffel 2009, 4; Griffel 2016b vii-xv; Rudolph 2016, 32-53). That 
accusation is no longer regnant, thanks to powerful critiques by Peter Gran, 
Frank Griffel, Reinhard Schulze, and others (Peters 1990; Gran 1996; Schulze 
2000, 2016; Hofheinz 2018; Salvatore, Tottoli, and Rahimi 2018), but not yet 
fully disavowed.11  
Much of the criticism rests on al-Ghazali’s famous refutation of the philoso-
phers, Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) (Ghazālī 
1997). In contrast to Avicenna (d. 1037) and his disciples who claimed that 
their theological views agreed with those of the theologians, al-Ghazali held 
that true knowledge could only be attained as a gift from God by revelation. He 
was also well aware that Sufi leaders too professed a claim to privileged 
knowledge of the divine, though not by rational thought, but through mystical 
intuition (Madelung 2015, 27, Griffel 2016c).12  
The past decade has seen several attempts at exonerating al-Ghazali from 
blame for the apparent decline of philosophy in the Islamic world. Wilferd 
Madelung (Madelung 2015) and Massimo Campanini (Campanini 2011) have 
                                                             
11  Jonathan Berkey wrote in 2003 that between the fifth/eleventh and ninth/fifteenth centu-
ries, the rational sciences such as philosophy and logic tended to become marginalized from 
what he calls the “Sunni intellectual mainstream,” although he adds, “there is nothing in-
herently anti-rational about Islam” (Berkey 2003, 229-30). 
12  Al-Ghazali criticizes 20 teachings of the Muslim philosophers. According to Madelung, three 
of those mark a departure from Islam: 1) The view that the word has no beginning in the 
past and is not created in time, 2) the view that God’s knowledge includes only classes of 
beings (universals) and does not extend to individual beings and their circumstances (par-
ticulars), and finally, 3) that after death the souls of humans will never again return to their 
bodies. 
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written on al-Ghazali’s theoretical depth, and Frank Griffel (Griffel 2009, 
2016, 2016b) and others point to his many outlier positions on commonly held 
Ash‘ari tenets. Other scholars, including Khaled El-Rouayheb, have echoed 
Henry Corbin and many Iranian scholars to argue that the study of philosophy 
and logic remained very much alive in the Islamic east, and particularly in Iran 
(Algar 1980, Landolt 1999, El-Rouayheb 2010, 133-56, 228-59; Qummī 2017).  
There is yet another angle to al-Ghazali’s vindication that merits further 
scrutiny. A cursory look at medieval Christian political thought will reveal that 
in divorcing philosophy from religion, al-Ghazali in many ways went along the 
same road as William of Ockham (d. 1347) and Marsilius of Padua (d. 1342), 
both considered in the Christian political tradition as iconoclasts who helped 
destroy the hierocratic edifice upheld by the papacy. Like al-Ghazali, Ock-
ham’s theology was animated by political controversies, in his case the schism 
that plagued the Franciscan order and the papacy in the early fourteenth century 
(Shogimen 2007, 1-35).13 Ockham maintained that absolutely nothing could be 
proved about God through natural reason. The existence of God is an object of 
faith, not of demonstration. It is, Ockham said, indeed probable that there is a 
God, that He has endowed man with a soul, and that this soul is an incorporeal 
and immortal substance, but none of this can be shown in philosophy, and so, 
in spite of what the theologians might say, it cannot be demonstrated in theolo-
gy. In short, it cannot be demonstrated at all. God’s existence is a matter of 
faith alone. Ockham’s views that belief in God is a matter of faith rather than 
knowledge, and that neither theology nor philosophy can prove God’s exist-
ence, and finally that it is the will of God rather than an innate essence which 
determines which objects are good (Friedman 2012; Pelletier 2013, 206-70), 
resonate with al-Ghazali’s position.  
Ockham’s views have been read in the history of Christian political thought 
as having dealt a devastating blow to the hierocratic idea of the Ecclesia and 
the unity of the Christian body politic. It destroyed “the conception that politi-
cal society was a Church, and substituted for this idea a purely naturalistic 
societas humana” (Wilks 1964, 90). The end for which mankind exists, and the 
way in which human society shall be organized, must be established by earthly 
criteria, according to Ockham; as it was to al-Ghazali: 
Although we say that God may do to His subjects as He wills, and that the ob-
servance of their good reason is not incumbent upon Him, we do not deny that 
reason indicates what is advantageous and disadvantageous and warns against 
ruin and urges the attraction of what is of benefit. Nor do we deny that the 
messengers were sent for the good of creation in religion and world matters as 
                                                             
13  As in the case of al-Ghazali, modern scholarship on Ockham is sharply divided: some see 
Ockham as an innovative destroyer of the Church and defender of Empire; some as a tradi-
tional constitutional liberal; and others as an apolitical theologian; see Shogimen 2007, 10; 
Nederman 2008; Pelletier 2013, 209-10. 
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a bounty from God, not as a duty obligated upon Him. (Al-Ghazali 1971, 162-
3)14 
Al-Ghazali is advocating for a religion conducive to the maintenance of public 
peace. His notion of “true Islam” is one that is in the service of government, 
what may be termed as secularity. That same objective animated the Refor-
mation in Europe, as Armando Salvatore has demonstrated, with secularity’s 
roots in this instance found in “several innovative systematizations by Domini-
can and Franciscan scholars during the Axial Renaissance” (Salvatore 2005, 
418-19; Bejan 2017). Secularity, he goes on to argue, is a Euro-Islamic, or 
perhaps more precisely, an Islamo-Christian concept. Again, the point here is 
not to suggest a connectedness between the practice and history of secularity as 
it developed in the Islamic world and in Europe, but rather to emphasize a 
concurrent and non-synchronous development. 
The unbridgeable gap between the two divergent readings of strikingly simi-
lar views – one prevailing in the study of Islamic political thought that points to 
al-Ghazali as a defender of orthodoxy against innovation and philosophy, and 
the second prevalent in the history of political thought in medieval Christianity 
that celebrates Ockham’s role in undermining the united Christian body politic 
espoused by the papacy, and paving the way for bifurcating the secular from 
the spiritual in late medieval Christianity – can be explained by recalling sever-
al of the points made earlier regarding the identification of a proper context that 
must precede a historical intellectual inquiry.  
In his “On the Elusiveness of Context,” Takashi Shogimen asks: How can 
we decide the pertinent context in which a given object of historical study 
should be examined? His response is that one cannot embark on a historical 
inquiry by simply coming up with a certain context, as Quentin Skinner sug-
gests, the relevance of which one presumes. To a large extent, identifying a 
relevant context is logically antecedent to the inquiry – for it is only in the 
purview of its own context that the illocutionary force of a narrative assumes 
singularity and invites further interrogation. Therefore, Shogimen asserts, a 
genuinely historical inquiry begins by forming a question about why an author 
makes a certain set of remarks in a given text because the remarks defy “the 
current theory” (Shogimen 2016, 251), i.e., what was considered conventional 
in its context. The puzzling fact that points to a new context appropriate for the 
study of Islamic political thought is – as I hope to have shown – the radically 
different readings of similar sets of remarks by Ockham and by al-Ghazali. Put 
differently, it is impossible to read the politics in al-Ghazali’s thought without 
due consideration of the ideological debates and the political controversies that 
animated them. Crucially, it is the political climate, rather than doctrinal inno-
vation, that forges al-Ghazali’s outstanding stature (and, I suspect, Ockham’s 
                                                             
14  The passage is cited from El-Shamsy 2016, 91-2. 
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as well). On many issues of cosmology, his positions dovetailed Avicenna’s 
(Griffel 2016) and, though he was one of the first to adopt the idea that the 
common good was an important objective of Muslim jurisprudence, he was by 
no means the sole pioneer.  
Purveyance of the common good was a staple of European political debates 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Kempshall 1999; Shogimen 2018) – 
as well as those in the Islamic world in the eleventh and twelfth. As was secu-
larity as process – and secular politics when disambiguated into concern for the 
common good, the separation of religion from politics and religion from phi-
losophy. If the practice of politics in the Christian world diverged from the 
Islamic model beginning roughly in the fifteenth century, might this not neces-
sitate a more carefully calibrated reading of the historiographical register?15 
The presentism in evidence in the historiography of political thought in the 
Islamic world starts not in the Islamic world itself, but in the American and, to 
a lesser extent, the European academy.16 It stems, at least in part, from a sys-
tematic undermining of the practical regard of political thought – a sine qua 
non of methodologically rigorous historical inquiry. Where is the political it 
hopes to address,17 or the debate that may serve as its context, or the puzzling 
fact that can guide us to its pertinent context? What politics, in short, does 
Western academic writing on Islam intend to transform? 
The dissonance in question is by no means limited to scholarship on the Is-
lamic world. In a roundtable on “Presentism” published in Past and Present, 
Rana Mitter points to a strikingly different accommodation of the pre-
Communist past in Chinese academic and popular histories when compared 
with the Western output. Since the mid-1980s, Mitter writes, a new understand-
ing of China’s experience during the Second World War has emerged in China, 
one that emphasizes continuity with its pre-revolutionary past “by implying a 
continuum between the actions of the Nationalist government and the Com-
munist one” (Mitter 2017, 216). The revisionism is driven by China’s objective 
to boost its moral claim against Japan and Taiwan, present-day rivals contend-
ing for hegemony, by making the case that its demands were ignored in the 
post-war settlements and, therefore, merit serious consideration. The nationali-
zation of the past cultivated by China’s officialdom is also embraced by Chi-
                                                             
15  The prevalence and reach of the “great divergence” hypothesis in explaining Europe’s rise to 
prominence has been questioned in recent scholarship; Humfress 2014, 16-29. 
16  Irfan Ahmad explores a cognate debate in the discipline of anthropology; Ahmad 2018. 
17  In a similar vein, Maurizio Viroli has argued that the true significance of the conclusion in 
Machiavelli’s The Prince is only evident when understood as the author’s intervention in po-
litical debates in fifteenth-century Italy, rather than a larger Christian or European context, 
see Viroli 2013, 113-48. And Yasir Yilmaz has lamented the “Ottoman” frame for currents 
and trends within a political unit spread across three continents. An argument for the 
emergence of modern and secular tendencies in the seventeenth-century Ottoman empire, 
for example, would have to apply to Egypt, Anatolia, and the Balkans; see Yilmaz 2017, 177. 
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nese society. In the West, however, although the turn has gained traction in 
academic circles, it is largely absent from the public sphere, which still remains 
enthralled by presentism.  
Towards the end of his review of Skinner’s contributions to meaning and 
method in the history of political thought, J. G. A. Pocock suggests that history, 
that is all written historiography which may be understood as conservative or 
liberal in its intention and effect, can be written “only in political societies with 
the capacity to manage their history in the present and, as a necessary accom-
paniment, to review and renew it in the perceived past.” He adds:  
Our world is divided, in short, into those who claim to have, to know, to write, 
and to change histories of their own making, and those who say that this is not 
their situation and they doubt how far it is that of those who claim it. If ‘histo-
ry’ in the former sense cannot be imposed on those who do not have it, they 
cannot demand its abnegation by those who have grounds for claiming it. (Po-
cock 2004, 549-50) 
Pocock’s claim is, one hopes, an outlier position in current debates on global 
thought. But perhaps acknowledging the present-day and presentist context of 
all histories of political thought, most of which are artifices of the very same 
nexus of power and ideology that is the supposed purview of intellectual histo-
ry, will make it possible to challenge Pocock’s characterization and overcome 
the barriers that have marginalized the study of non-Western political thought. 
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